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Abstract 
 
The  main  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  determine  the  macro-prudential  indicators  of  financial 
stability that can be used for supervising the banking system in the CEMAC zone. Going by a set 
of indicators drawn from similar works on macro-prudential supervision, and, more specifically, 
aggregate  microeconomic  variables  of  the  banking  sector,  macroeconomic  variables  and 
combinations  of  the  two,  we  were  able  to  identify  those  that  are  relevant  in  analysing  an 
imminent deterioration of the banking system in the subregion. At the end of this study, it was 
realised  that  claims on  the  private sector,  foreign direct  investments  and  the  combination  of 
exports and credits to the private sector, increase the risk of degradation of the banking system, 
while this risk is reduced by an increase in the exchange rate, increase in the internal resources of 
the banking system and inflation rate. The regulator should therefore bear this set of indicators in 
mind in order to facilitate a quick response to offset any potential banking crisis in the CEMAC 
region. 
 
Keywords: Banking System, Macro-Prudential Indicators, Weakness, Degradation 





L’objectif  du  présent  travail  est  d’identifier  des  indicateurs  macro-prudentiels  de  stabilité 
financière pouvant servir dans le cadre d’une surveillance du système bancaire en zone CEMAC. 
Partant d’un ensemble d’indicateurs répertoriés dans la littérature sur la surveillance macro-
prudentielle,  notamment  des  variables  microéconomiques  agrégées  du  secteur  bancaire,  des 
variables macroéconomiques et des combinaisons de ces deux ensembles, nous avons déterminé 
les plus pertinents dans l’annonce d’une dégradation du système bancaire de la sous-région. A 
l’issue de cette étude, il ressort que, les créances sur le secteur privé, les investissements directs 
étrangers ainsi que la conjonction des crédits au secteur privé et des exportations, accroissent le 
risque de dégradation du système bancaire. A contrario, ce risque est réduit par l’appréciation 
du taux de change, l’augmentation des fonds propres du système bancaire et du taux d’inflation. 
Cet ensemble d’indicateurs devrait donc retenir l’attention du régulateur afin de permettre une 
intervention rapide qui résorberait toute crise bancaire potentielle en zone CEMAC. 
 
Mots clés: Système Bancaire, Indicateurs Macro-Prudentiels, Fragilité, Dégradation. 
JEL Classification: C12, C13, G21, G28 
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Introduction 
 
Analysing the stability of a financial system is of prime importance, given the likely adverse 
effects
4
 that a financial crisis could have, not only at the level of economic activity but also at the 
social level. For some years now, we have been witnessing the development of a new analytical 
approach,  referred  to  as  the  macro-prudential  approach,  for  preventing  crises  in  the  banking 
system. Actually, the micro-prudential approach, which for long was the only method used as a 
crisis warning system, has today shown its limits
5, as it emerges from recent financial crises that 
it is not enough to monitor banking indicators to be able to make dependable forecasts on a 
failure of the system. Moreover, excessive recourse to micro-prudential rules can even compound 
the aversion of banks for risk-taking and lead to the bankruptcy of some institutions (Borio [4], 
2003). 
 
The  macro-prudential  approach  appears  today  to  be  an  improvement  in  microprudential 
monitoring that helps to assess the global exposure of the banking system to a financial crisis. 
According to Sundararajan et al. (2002)
6, “macro-prudential analysis refers to the assessment and 
control  of  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  a  financial  system  in  terms  of  macroprudential 
indicators made up of indicators of financial soundness and other macroeconomic indicators, 
such as the GDP growth rate and inflation rate, with information on the structure of the financial 
system, qualitative information on the institutional and regulatory framework, in particular, by 
assessing consistence with international standards and codes, and the results of tension tests.” 
Therefore, macro-prudential analysis helps the regulator to have a holistic view of the banking 
system.  Evans  [13]  (2000),  in  a  comprehensive  study,  identified  a  set  of  macroprudential 
indicators  which  he  divided  into  two  categories:  aggregate  microprudential  indicators  and 
macroeconomic indicators. However, the diversity of financial systems and the multiplicity of 
indicators  identified  require  the  local  regulator  to  assess  which  indicators  are  relevant  for  a 
particular financial system. 
 
In the late 1980s, the banking system of the CEMAC zone, under the supervision of BEAC, 
witnessed  some  shortcomings  (individual  bankruptcy, illiquidity  situation,  etc.)  with  negative 
consequences on economic activity in the sub-region (Djine and Tamba [23], 1995). This crisis 
was the result of the poor management of these financial institutions and the deteriorating terms 
of trade during those years. Today, globalisation and interconnexion of financial markets increase 
the  probability  of  spillover  effects  that  can  lead  to  the  “importation”  of  a  banking  crisis. 
Consequently, it is today necessary to strengthen the supervision mechanism in order to take into 
account both the individual situations of banks and the overall resilience of the banking system, 
with a view to reducing the risk of banking crisis monitoring. A lot of efforts have been made to 
this end since the mid 1990s. Today, the authority in charge of ensuring financial stability works 
with a set of macroeconomic variables. However, it would be interesting for it to know precisely 
                                                 
4 The weaknesses of a banking system, be it in a developing country of in a developped country, can be a threat to 
financial stability both within the country and at the international level (Bále [8], 1997). Also see Borio [4] (2003), 
Plihon et al. [19] (2004), for a better understanding of the consequences of the instability of a financial system. 
5 Goodhart [25] (2004) cites the case of Japan in 1998, where banks taken individually were financially strong, but 
all vulnerable to the crisis of the housing sector. 
6 Quoted by Yung Chul [25]. 
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which variables are the most relevant for assessing the financial system. In other words, what will 
be the convincing power of each variable to forecast a degradation of the banking system? This 
approach,  which  seeks  to  significantly  reduce  the number  of  variables  that  could  be  used  to 
predict a banking crisis and assess the predictive power of each of them, has a two-pronged 
advantage in terms of efficiency and cost.  The regulator can easily read into the situation of a 
banking system, as it will no longer be necessary to attach the same importance to all the several 
indicators,  but  to  concentrate  on  those  which,  if  adjusted,  can  lead  to  an  increase  in  the 
probability of predicting a failure in the system. 
 
The purpose of this research paper is to determine the indicators of financial stability that could 
be used in monitoring the banking system in the CEMAC zone. Specifically, going by a set of 
indicators drawn from similar works on macro-prudential supervision, we intend to identify those 
that are relevant in analysing an imminent deterioration of the banking system in the sub-region. 
 
This paper is divided into two parts. Part I examines banking system supervision by dealing with 
the microprudential approach in section (1) and the macroprudential approach in section (2). Part 
II is a presentation of the methodology  used and the results obtained, first by indicating the 
theoretical analytical framework in section (3), and then by putting the theoretical framework into 
practical use and looking at the econometric model in section (4). In section (5) we attempt to 
propound the parameters of the model and analyze the results obtained. 
                                        Macro-Prudential Monitoring Indicators  8 
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I. Monitoring the banking system 
 
According to the European Central Bank, financial stability refers to a situation in which the 
financial system is capable of resisting shocks without triggering adverse knock-on effects on the 
use of savings, investment and payments processing in the economy (Tordjman [24], 2007). The 
monetary authority has more reasons than one to be concerned with the stability of the banking 
system. Firstly, such stability can be considered a public good, meaning a good characterized by 
non-rivalry and non-exclusion. This is where the supervisory authority comes in to make it freely 
available  to  users  (banks,  households,  etc.)  and  ensure  its  preservation.  Secondly,  banks  are 
considered key players in the  transmission of the monetary policy of the Central Bank (Landau 
[18], 2009). In case of a weakness in the banking system, it may be more costly for the Central 
Bank to tighten its monetary policy (IMF [14], 2006)
7. Finally, commercial banks represent a big 
share of  the  clientele of  the Central Bank  which  must thus  constantly  seek  to  monitor  their 
situation and solvency (op. cit [14]). 
 
The banking system is generally exposed to two types of risk that could lead to a crisis situation. 
Firstly, internal or endogenous risk that comes from within each bank that makes up the system 
and which is seen in its income statement. This type of risk is examined mainly through the 
microprudential  approach  which  assesses  the  weakness  of  banks,  with  such  weakness  being 
deduced from the bill of health of all the banks
8. Secondly, external or exogenous risk of the bank 
which comes from two main sources: the contagion effect and the macroeconomic environment 
in which the bank operates. The macroprudential approach, with ultimate goal to assess the risk 
of generalized weakness of the financial system and not only individual institutions will be used 
to  cash this type of risk (De Bandt and Oung [11], 2004). 
. 
 
1   The microprudential approach 
 
1.1  Definition and objective 
 
This  approach,  which  entails  the  individual  assessment  (internal  control)  of  each  financial 
establishment,  is  in  line  with  the  recommendations  of  the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking 
Supervision. Here, the supervisory authority has to ensure that banks comply with the regulations 
relating  to  the  management,  caution  and  dissemination  of  information,  in  order  to  protect 
depositors and guarantee confidence in the banking system. 
 
1.2   The tools used 
 
Several authors (Shen and Hsieh [21], 2004; Cole and Gunther [7], 1998) analyse two micro-
prudential monitoring variants. The first one is based on a periodic audit of banks and the second 
                                                 
7 Actually, the fragility of the banking system generally leads to panic among depositors who usually react by 
withdrawing their savings from banks. This could create the phenomenon of “bank runs” which devolves on the 
Central Bank which will then act as a last resort lender. This situation then increases the amount of liquidity 
circulating in the economy and could lead to inflation 
8 This approach is known  as the Bottom-Top Approach.                                        Macro-Prudential Monitoring Indicators  9 
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on observing a set of financial stability indicators (FSIs) calculated using the data transmitted by 
banks. 
 
Auditing a bank helps to control its financial situation in keeping with applicable regulations and 
ascertain the accuracy of the information it transmits to the supervisory authority. It thus helps 
the supervisory authority to have reliable information on each bank. However, this approach is 
quite costly both for the supervisory authority and for the bank. The number of audits should thus 
be few and far between, sometimes once a year. To ensure some level of continuity in control, the 
audit should be conducted using the  data transmitted more regularly by  banks,  meaning that 
micro-prudential financial stability indicators
9 (FSIs) will be used. 
 
FSIs  are  indicators  which  give  information  on  the  situation  and  stability  of  the  financial 
institutions in a country, and on those of companies and households with which they interact 
(IMF  [14],  2006).  Determining  the  “FSIs”  is  of  prime  importance  in  ensuring  efficient 
supervision of banks. Actually, FSIs can act as filters which retain only a few banks for indepth 
assessement. These FSIs from the accounting situation of the bank can be transmitted to the 
supervisory authority on a regular basis. It can then use the information so received to determine 
the situation of the bank. FSIs can also be grouped into sectoral data, thereby facilitating a shift 
from the micro-prudential approach to sectoral monitoring. 
. 
For an institution, FSIs are generally got using the ratio of variables relating to its liabilities and 
assets, which give an idea of its solvency. In banking, these indicators are divided into two sub-
groups (op. cit [14]): central indicators which every banking system is required to produce, and 
complementary indicators which banking systems are encouraged to produce. Central indicators 
cover risks related to the adequacy of owners’ equity, the quality of assets, profitability, liquidity 
and  exchange  rate.  The  supervisory  authority  summarizes  the  information  provided  by  FSIs 
through a bank rating system that helps to classify banks. This ranking can be done using a 
discriminating analysis or a logit-probit model; meaning that the scores can be calculated and 
classification done automatically as soon as FSIs are received from banks
10. 
 
1.3   Limits of the approach 
 
In addition to the structural disadvantage of not considering the macroeconomic environment and 
the  difficulty  of  aggregating  the  results  obtained  for  each  bank  into  the  system,  the  micro-
prudential approach has two other equally important shortcomings: firstly slowness in predicting 
banking system weakness and secondly difficulty in identifying threats to the system. 
 
Indeed, even if we suppose that the problem of aggregation is solved, microprudential indicators 
reflect the situation of a bank at a given time. Considering fluctuations in economic activity, these 
indicators could be used to make forecasts of imminent crises (if we adopt a pessimistic attitude) 
                                                 
9 The term micro is used as against the term macro which refers to the aggregation of these indicators to assess the 
stability of any banking system. 
10In the early 1970s, the United States Federal Reserve developed a rating system that helped to determine the frailty 
of a bank. This system referred to as CAMEL is based on five criteria: capital adequacy, quality of assets, quality of 
management, profit level and liquidity level. In this rating system marks ranging from 1 to 5 are awarded to each 
bank, in increasing order of his fragility.                                        Macro-Prudential Monitoring Indicators  10 
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which never occur; or, if we adopt a cautious attitude, make very belated forecasts of crises 
which actually occur, for corrective measures to be taken. 
 
Moreover, once banks are classified as weak or not, if the aggregation of this ranking betrays 
some frailty of the banking system, it will then become difficult for the supervisory authority to 




Redressing the system could thus be done case by case. This has the disadvantage of being very 
costly  for  the  regulator,  encouraging  moral  hazard  behaviours




2.   The Macro-prudential approach 
 
The need to be able to predict periods of instabilty in the banking system became crucial at the 
end of the period of the global crisis of the 1990s
13. In the face of numerous economic and social  
costs caused by these different crises, the international community (policy makers, researchers, 
etc.) began to consider  the manner to improve the mechanism used at the time to monitor the 
financial  sector.  One  of  the  responses  to  this  question  happened  to  be  what  is  today  called 
“macro-prudential  analysis  of  the  stability  of  the  financial  sector”.  This  section  is  entirely 
devoted  to  presenting  this  analytical  approach.  After  defining  the  concept  and  outlining  the 
composition  of  the  macroprudential  indicators,  we  will  then  examine  the  application  of  this 
approach. 
 
2.1   Definition 
 
According to Borio [5] (2008), it is not easy to find a universally accepted definition for the term 
“macro-prudential” because, even if the connotation to which it refers is directly recognizable, its 
meaning  remains  largely  ambiguous.  In  our  literature  review  therefore,  we  identified  some 
approaches on how to define the concept. The approach adopted at the BIS
14
 consists of defining 
the  term  “macro-prudential”  using  its  opposite,  the  term  microprudential.  According  to  this 
conception,  the  macro-prudential  approach  is  a  (good)  complement  of  the  microprudential 
approach which helps (by taking into account macroeconomic factors) to perfect the banking 
system monitoring mechanism by taking into account not only the individual exposure of banking 
institutions but also that of the system as a whole. 
 
Similarly, in their attempt to define macro-prudential indicators, Evans [13] (2000), Hilbers et al 
[16] (2000) state that these are pointers to the health and stability of the financial system which 
can be used to assess its vulnerability to shocks. 
                                                 
11 Individual bank fragility indicators can differ under the action of one and the same macroeconomic indicator 
which then constitutes the cause which must be tackled (Bernanke [2], 2008). 
12 This means that a bank will take risks while counting on the regulator to take action in case of problems. 
13 Many regions of the world were affected, some of the most recurrently crises cited are the contagion effect in Latin 
America (1994) and Asia (1997). 
14 Bank of International Settlements (BIS).                                        Macro-Prudential Monitoring Indicators  11 
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The macro-prudential approach brings together a series of methods that can be used to assess the 
impact of a macroeconomic shock on the stability of the system by dint of the aforementioned 
indicators  of  weakness  in  the  banking  system.  Unlike  the  microprudential  approach,  this 
approach attempts to assess the overall vulnerability of the system. The objective is, not to protect 
the deposits of bank customers, but rather to prevent a systemic crisis that can lead to high costs 
due  to  a  drop  in  economic  activity or  the  recapitalization  of the  banking  system.  Instead  of 
attaching  a  lot  of  importance  to  each  bank  as  an  independent  financial  institution,  the 
macroprudential approach rather considers the contribution of the bank in terms of risk induced 
on the system (Crockett [10], 2000). 
 
 
Comparing Macro and microprudential approaches 
  Macroprudential approach  Microprudential approach 
Operational objective  Reduce the risk of weakness of the 
entire system 
Reduce the risk of bankruptcy 
Ultimate objective  Avoid losses (in GDP points) due to 
a financial crisis 
Ensure the protection of investors 
and creditors 
Types of risk  (Partly) Endogenous  Exogenous 






Monitoring method  In terms of overall weakness of the 
system (top-bottom) 
In terms of individual weakness 
(bottom-top) 
 
Source: Borio [4] (2003) 
 
Thus  the  take  home  message  here  is  that  the  main  aim  of  the  macroprudential  approach  of 
monitoring the financial system is to protect the entire system. It does this by putting in place an 
early warning system on the periods of weakness of the said system.  The warning system should 
be based on information concerning the structure of the system, the observation of aggregate 
macroeconomic and microeconomic financial stability indicators (FSIs) (Cih´ak [6], 2005); with 
their evolution having been earlier compared to that of the system’s vulnerabilty. 
 
2.2  Composition of Macro-Prudential Indicators (MPI) 
 
Macroprudential indicators are generally made up of two main groups of variables: aggregate 
microprudential  variables  obtained  by  collating  information  on  the  individual  viability  of 
financial  institutions,  and  macroeconomic  variables  which  have  a  potential  influence  on  the 
financial system.  It would however be presumptuous to think that, on their own, the  above-
mentioned variables are enough to help make dependable forecasts on the bill of health of the 
financial system. In this connection, Evans [13] (2000) notes that, in making an overall appraisal 
of the financial system, it would be advisable to consider the qualitative characteristics of the 
system
15. 
                                                 
15  He makes mention among other things of “the structure of the financial system and markets; the regulation to lay 
down  accounting  standards  and  others  as  well  as  obligations  to  divulge  information;  rules  governing  the 
classification of loans, provisioning and income recognition and other prudential rules; the quality of monitoring 
exercised on financial establishments; the legal framework (especially with regard to bankruptcy and foreclosure); 
incentives, and safety nets as well as liberalization and deregulation movements ”                                        Macro-Prudential Monitoring Indicators  12 
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2.3   Application of the macroprudential analysis 
 
According  to  the  Guide  for  establishing  FSIs  prepared  by  the  IMF  [14]  (2006),  the 
macroprudential analysis is done by defining a reference framework including four elements: 
 
￿  Assessing  the risk of shocks on the financial system; 
￿  Recourse to Financial Stability Indicators; 
￿  Analysing microfinancial interactions; 
￿  Monitoring the macroeconomic situation. 
 
The macroprudential approach therefore focuses on the factors of vulnerability of the financial 
system and the interaction between macroeconomic trends and financial stability. For example, 
this entails being able to detect the vulnerability factors of non-financial institutions in order to 
reduce credit risk which, if allowed to rise, could lead to an increase in the number of non-
performing  loans  and  negatively  affect  the  capacity  of  the  banking  system  to  honour  its 
commitments. 
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II.   Methodological Approach 
 
3.  Theoretical framework for analysing the banking sytstem 
 
3.1. Definition of concepts 
 
Before  analysing  how  weak  a  banking  system  is,  we  need  to  start  by  defining  the  various 
underlying concepts of the theoretical analysis.  The outbreak of a banking crisis goes along some 
stages from the weakness of basic units, banks, to the fragility of the entire banking system 
coupled with successive periods of deterioration
16. There is no consensus on the definition of the 
above-mentioned concepts among the different authors who have written on banking supervision. 
The various definitions are informed on earlier works (Hermosillo [15], 1999; Bhattacharyay [3], 





￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  Weakness of a bank. 
 
A bank is said to be weak when it presents the risk of requiring external intervention to ensure its 
survival. Thus, the weakness of a bank refers to the risk for the bank to no longer be able to 
honour its short-term commitments (clients’ deposits, loans from other institutions, etc.). Such 
failure of payment could then be passed on to other economic agents and upset the economic and 
social environment. 
 
Shen and Hsieh [21] (2004) identify three approaches used in defining bank failure. The first is to 
consider  the  periodic  adjudications  of  bankruptcy  by  the  supervisory  authority.  The  second 
approach  is  that  which  better  suits  the  definition  of  bank  weakness.  Here,  the  situation  of 
bankruptcy is considered as “quasi-bankruptcy” and supposes the intervention of the supervisory 
authority in order to avoid the total closure of the bank which could be a bad sign for the market. 
The  third  approach  used  by  Hermosillo  [15]  (1999)  entails  comparing  the  ratio  of  bank 
commitments coverage in relation to a given theshold. 
 
As indicated above, the weakness of a bank can also be analyzed using the CAMEL rating. 
 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  Weakness of a banking system 
 
The weakness of the banking system can be seen as an aggregation of weaknesses of individual 
banks  coupled  with  the  resulting  negative  externalities.  As  of  today,  there  is  no  universally 
accepted definition for the weakness of a financial system or even a banking system. However, 
there are generally three characteristics of the notion of financial vulnerability (Bhattacharyay 
[3], 2003): 
                                                 
16 The use of the terms fragility and deterioration, even though in a pejorative sense, is in line with the preoccupation 
of the regulator who attaches more importance to the risk of seeing the system collapse, considering the negative 
consequences of such an eventuality on the economy.                                        Macro-Prudential Monitoring Indicators  14 
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– significant loss of confidence of economic agents in the financial system (financial institutions 
and financial markets); 
– inability of financial institutions to efficiently play the role of intermediation; 
– spreading of financial vulnerability to the entire economy. 
 
As far is the regulator is concerned, this weakness can be seen as a risk for him  to have to 
intervene in order to rescue a banking system. In this case, the degree of weakness is established 
using the cost of such an intervention. The advantages of this definition are: it is objective, based 
on individual quantifiable indicators and can be assessed. However, the difficulty with such an 
approach is how to aggregate the weaknesses obtained for each bank. Two approaches can thus 
be considered: approach by numbers and approach by costs of interventions. 
 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  Deterioration of the banking system 
 
The deterioration of the banking system is part of the dynamics of weakness. A banking system 
can thus be said to have deteriorated when it is more fragile at a particular period than at a 
previous one. 
 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  The crisis of the banking system 
 
This  marks  the  outcome  of  the  banking  system  deterioration  process.  It  therefore  becomes 
necessary for the regulator to intervene in order to reduce the magnitude of the damage caused by 
the crisis and boost banking activities. 
 
 
3.2   Formalizing the notion of banking system weakness  
 
To define the weakness of the banking system, we go by the hypothesis that the situation of a 
banking system depends only on the situation of all the banks. With this, we can then define the 
weakness of a banking system using all the banks. The macroprudential approach is therefore 
aimed at assessing the impact of macroeconomic variables on this weakness. 
 
In this sub-section, we present two methods for aggregating the individual weaknesses of banks 
into a systemic weakness. To this end, the following variables will be used: 
n1t:   number of banks ranked as weak under the rating system as of the date t 
  n2t:   number of banks classified as not weak under the rating system as of the date t 
  E1t:   sum of the net commitments of n1t banks classified as weak as of the date t 
   Ft:   intervention funds available in the coffers of the regulator 
   αt:   level of weaknesses ranging from 0 to 1 as of the date t. 
 
3.2.1 Approach by numbers 
 
This is a direct approach which entails comparing the number of banks deemed weak by the 
rating system to the number of banks considered to be financially viable. Thus, by adopting the 
values above, 
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The banking system will be said to be weak if n1t > n2t 
 
From this definition, the higher the number of weak banks in a banking system the weaker it is 
itself. But such a generalization of the concept of weakness has the disadvantage that it does not 
take into account the weight of individual banks
17. 
 
3.2.2   Approach by cost of the regulator’s intervention 
 
For the regulator, in order to take on board the weight of banks in the weakness of the banking 
system, it would be advisable to consider the amount of injections necessary to revive it in case 
its weakness leads to a banking crisis. But, in the event of a crisis, the banks the regulator already 
considers to be weak will not be able to refund their debts, meaning that such debts will have to 
be covered by the monetary authority in order to avoid the total collapse of the banking system. 
Therefore, the weakness of the system could then be assessed by comparing the cost of a rescue 
operation of the system in the event of a crisis with the funds available for such an operation. The 
cost of a rescue operation refers to the sum of net commitments (clients’ deposits and debts of the 
bank minus owners’ equity and reserves in the Central Bank
18) of banks considered to be weak. 
The  degree  of  systemic  weakness  will  then  be  defined  as  the  relationship  between  these 
commitments and the funds available to the regulator. Let nt be the degree of weakness of the 
banking system as of the date t. 
 
Therefore: 
     
                                                 (1)  
and 
 
The banking system is said to be weak if nt  > αt. 
 
3.3   Formalizing the notion of banking system deterioration  
 
The deterioration of the banking system represents the evolution of its weakness and is thus part 
of a dynamic process. Therefore, the deterioration of a banking system at a given date is the 
growth rate of its weakness as of that date. 
 
By considering the approach by numbers, a system can be said to have deteriorated if n1t <n1t+1. 
 
With the approach by costs, if we let βt be the deterioration of the banking system as of the date t, 
using the values above, we have: 
 
           
        (2) 
                                                 
17 For example, can it be said that a system with 10 % of weak banks representing 50 % in terms of market share, 
presents the same weakness as a system with 10 % of weak banks representing a 10 % market share? Thus, when 
assessing the weakness of a banking system, it would be advisable to take into account the weight of banks. 
18 We can also add the financial claims of the bank less its doubtful claims.                                        Macro-Prudential Monitoring Indicators  16 
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The financial system will be said to have deteriorated or not depending on whether βt is positive 
or negative. The rate of deterioration will be found using the absolute value of βt. 
 





3.4   Another formula (considering all the banks) 
 
Even though the formulae presented above all use the secondary information on the weight of 
weak banks, they have the disadvantage that they consider only such banks in determining the 
weakness coefficient. This other approach is based on two hypotheses: 
– All the banks are presumed to be weak; 
– The contribution (weighting) of each bank to the weakness of the system increases with the risk 
they represent. 
 
These two assumptions help in finding the coefficient of weakness directly by using the score 
obtained during the rating. This has the advantage of eliminating the “differentiation” effect
19
 
which can be noticed by using classes of scores rather than the score itself. 
 
Therefore, we are supposing that the score function is normalized and that it increases with the 




sit   score obtained by bank i (i = 1...p) on date t; 
Eit   amount of commitments of bank i on date t; 




           
                 (3) 
              
 
In defining the weakness of a banking system, the regulator can decide to attach more importance 
to the weakest banks, by giving more weight to their commitments in the formula to find the 
degree of weakness. To this end, we can consider a transformation (f function) which increases 
                                                 
19 If, for instance, we let the score used in defining class 1 to be between 0 and 10, and that used to define class 2 
between 10 and 20, then two individuals having obtained 9.8 and 10.1 will fall under two different classes without 
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the score value of the weakest banks and reduces that of the less weak. With this, we can rewrite 
the formula above as follows: 
 
            (4) 
              
 
 
4  Application of the theoretical approach 
 
The definitions and concepts presented above can be seen differently depending on the context of 
monitoring and the tools of the supervisory authority. In fact, following the characteristics of the 
banking system, the supervisory authority generally gathers a lot of information from banking 
institutions.  It  then  uses  such  information  to  determine  the  indicators  which  will  be  used  to 
monitor the stability of the system. For reasons of clarity, it is therefore important to establish 
metadata which help to give a good understanding of the indicators used. In this section, we 
identify the proxy variables that facilitate the application of the theoretical framework developed 
above to the case of CEMAC. 
 
The database we have on all the banks in CEMAC is from SYSCO
20
 and includes some twenty 
variables  and  concerns  all  the  commercial  banks  of  the  sub-region.  One  of  the  variables  is 
qualitative  and  shows  a  classification  of  banks  into  7  groups
21,  while  the  other  variables 
(quantitative) are microprudential variables recorded on a monthly basis. The database covers the 
period running from 31/01/2001 to 31/12/2005. Data is not available for some banks which either 
entered our sample after the starting date or for some other reasons. 
 
According to the SYSCO rating, 67 % of the banks surveyed fall under classes 1 and 2. In order 
to  ensure  some  fluctuation  in  the  weakness  variable,  we  will  consider  that  groups  1  and  2 
represent viable banks while the other groups are made up of banks considered to be weak. 
 
4.1   Construction of a banking system weakness variable 
 
For the construction of this variable, we need to know three elements: the banks considered to be 
weak during the period under review; the amount of commitments of these banks for each period 
and the amount of funds the regulator would be ready to inject in order to prevent the system 
from going bankrupt. Bearing in mind the weakness threshold allowed by the regulator for each 
period, we can define the binary variable of failure of a banking system. 
 
The banks we have chosen to consider weak, following the SYSCO class distribution, are those 
of classes 3A and 4B. For each bank, commitments are defined by deposits which include public 
deposits and private deposits. Since we do not have the variable of the amount the regulator has, 
to rescue the system, we used the Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache crisis determinant [12] (1997). 
In fact, these authors define a crisis period as a period when the ratio of the cost of rescuing the 
banking system to GDP is higher than 2%. We suppose that the amount of funds the regulator has 
                                                 
20 CEMAC bank rating system 
21 The classes are 1, 2, 3A, 3B, 3C, 4A, 4B                                        Macro-Prudential Monitoring Indicators  18 
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as of the date t, to rescue the system in the event of a crisis, is a fraction λ of the GDP which we 
put at 1%. 
 
Thus, for each banking system, the variable “degree of weakness”, was got by establishing a 
relationship between the monthly commitments of the banks of the system which are considered 
to be weak and 1% GDP of the corresponding quarter. 
 
4.2   Construction of the banking system deterioration variable 
 
Having  an  idea  of  the  degree  of  weakness  of  a  banking  system  is  a  key  input  used  by  the 
regulator to make decisions. However, it would be advisable for the regulator to buttress his 
choices with forecasts, on the strength of a limited number of indicators, of the probability of 
deterioration of the situation of the system. To develop such a forecasting mechanism, we had to 
assess  the  system  dynamics  by  comparing  successive  situations.  To  this  end,  we  used  the 
weakness variable to build a new quarterly variable that reflects the deterioration of the system, 
also on a quarterly basis. Monitoring a banking system should be a permanent activity. With this, 
one of the qualities required of a good indicator is that it should be available within a relatively 
short period of time (at most quarterly). This variable will be used in the regression model which 
will  be  developed  later.  To  uniformize  the  frequency  of  variables  used  in  the  study,  some 
macroeconomic variables presented in this paper were converted to their quarterly values when 
they were not available following the quaterly frequency. The method to get quarterly values as 
used here follows the Goldstein and Khan interpolation formula (1976)
22. 
 
Since the objective of this study is to clearly identify the variables which can be used as advanced 
indicators of the deterioration of the CEMAC banking system, we thought it necessary, after 
defining the notion of deterioration, to indicate how in real economics we can examine each of its 
constituent  elements.  However,  in  order  to  ensure  proper  variability  of  the  deterioration  and 
considering the data at our disposal, we had to impose another small condition. 
 
Therefore, the CEMAC banking system will be said to be deteriorating at the date t if the rate of 
variation of the degree of weakness between t and t + 1 is higher than 25%; 
 
This means that if: 
 
     
           (5)         
     
 
Therefore, we have    
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4.3   Presentation of other variables and data used 
 
In this section we present all the explanatory variables of the model as well as the sources of the 
data we used to determine the coefficients of the model. 
 
The approach adopted in the choice of indicators is that used by Shen and Hsieh [21] (2004), 
which entails looking for the explanatory variables of the failings in the banking system among 
the  aggregate  microprudential  variables,  the  macro-prudential  variables  and  variables  derived 
from micro-macro crossing. 
 
Below  are  the  variables  most  used  and  which  we  had  at  our  disposal  in  this  study.  The 
explanatory variables of the final model will be chosen among this set of variables. Since the 
variable of interest here is binary, we will use the econometry of qualitative variables. 
 
4.3.1   Aggregate micro-prudential variables 
 
Apart from the SYSCO rating variable and the owners’ equity variable, indicated above, we got 
all  the  micro-prudential  variables  for  each  bank  from  BEAC.  These  variables  were  used  to 
determine which variables will be used as aggregate micro-prudential indicators
23. The aggregate 
micro-prudential variables retained are: 
 
 
￿  Ratio of owners’ equity on total assets (fp- ta) 
 
A high value of this ratio for each bank helps to increase resilence and thus reduces the weakness 
of the system. Setting the adequate level of owners’ equity for banks should take into account the 
overall  risk  (credit risk  and  market  risk) to  which they  are  exposed as  well  as  their  general 
strategy (BIS [1],2000). The expected sign of the coefficient of this variable is thus negative, as it 
is supposed to slow down the deterioration of the banking system. 
 
￿  Ratio of bad debts on owners’ equity (credou-fp) 
 
With this ratio we can assess the quality of the banks’ assets. Thus, a high value of this ratio 
means that the banking system is exposed to an illiquidity risk and increases its weakness. 
 
￿  Other micro variables tested 
 
We used other micro-prudential variables in order to adopt the suitable model. They are: the ratio 
of bad debt over total debts, the ratio of loans over deposits, ratio of public receivables over total 
receivables, ratio of cash surpluses/deficits over owners’ equity. 
 
4.3.2   Macro-prudential variables 
 
                                                 
23 This calculation was done by finding the sum, firstly for a given month, of all the values observed for all the 
banks, and the interest variable.  Then, the aggregate and quarterly micro-prudential variable was calculated using 
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The macroeconomic data used is drawn from two sources: the World Development Indicator 
(WDI-2007) of the World Bank for GDP variables and foreign debt, on the one hand, and from 
the  International  Financial  Statistics  (IFS)  database  of  the  IMF  for  the  other  variables.  The 
variables  from  WDI  are  annual  and  had  to  be  converted  into  their  quarterly  values.  Some 
variables got from the IFS are quarterly variables while others are annual. 
 
￿  GDP growth rate (tcpib) 
 
An  increase  in  production  leads  to  an  increase in  incomes  and  thus enhances the  ability  for 
economic agents to meet their commitments. Thus, an upward movement in GDP is supposed to 
contribute to an improvement of the situation of the banking system. The expected sign for this 
variable is thus negative. 
 
￿  Rate of increase of the Dollar-CFA exchange rate (tctc) 
 
Since the countries of the CEMAC sub-region are price-takers, an increase in the exchange rate, 
all others things remaining equal, leads to an increase in export earnings expressed in the local 
currency. Since most of the goods imported into the CEMAC region come from Europe, they are 
not really affected by this increase in the exchange rate. The impact on the banking system should 
therefore be positive. Consequently, the expected sign for this variable is negative. 
 
￿  Foreign Direct Investment-GDP Ratio (fdi-pib) 
 
With the 1997 Asian crisis, it was realised that foreign capital, which was considered to be a 
strong  contributor  to  economic  growth,  could  actually  lead  to  a  systemic  financial  crisis.  
However, there is no doubt that an increase in FDIs has a positive impact on the stability of the 
financial system. Therefore the sign expected for this variable is negative. 
 
￿  Inflation (inflation) 
 
Generally, one of the objectives of the Central Bank is to ensure price stability. Even though the 
the adverse effects of a high level of inflation are known, the effects of a moderate level of 
inflation are rather mixed (Cordeiro [9], 2002). Thus, the impact of the inflation rate on the risk 
of deterioration of the banking system will depend on the average inflation level. Therefore we 
cannot express any opinion on the expected sign for this variable. 
 
￿  Other macro variables tested 
 
Many other macroeconomic variables were tested for the development of the final model. We 
have such macroeconomic variables as the export/GDP ratio, the foreign debt/foreign exchange 
reserves  ratio,  spread  (difference  between  the  lending  rate  and  the  borrowing  rate),  money 
supply/foreign reserves ratio. 
 
4.3.3   Variables obtained from the micro-macro combination 
 
￿  Ratio of credit to the private sector/GDP of the previous period (creasp-pib) 
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To get this ratio, we divided the claims of the banking system over the private sector for the 
preceding period by the GDP of that period. This ratio shows the risk taken by the banking sector 
in intermediation activities. Some works published by the Bank of International Settlements have 
shown that the ratio of credit to the private sector over GDP is a good indicator of financial 
instability (Pollin [20], 2001). The expected sign is positive. Actually, an increase in this ratio 
reflects an increase in risk taking by banks and worsens the deterioration of the system. 
 
￿  The Credit-Export Product (cre-export) 
 
To find this variable, we multiplied the export/GDP ratio by the ratio of credit to the private 
sector  over  total  credits  to  the  economy.  Considered  individually,  these  two  variables  are 
supposed  to  have  contrasting  effects  on  the  deterioration  of  the  banking  system.  In  fact,  an 
increase in credit leads to the taking of further risk and thus compounds the weakness of the 
system, while an increase in exports enhances the capacity of some beneficiaries of bank loans to 
meet their commitments and thus reduces the deterioration of the banking system. 
 
 
￿  Other micro-macro variables tested 
 
We also tested other combinations of micro and macro-prudential variables, notably: the product 
of the owners’ equity variable and the inflation rate variable, the product of the bad debts variable 
and the GDP growth rate variable. 
 
 
4.3.4   Choice of the final model 
 
To adopt a final model, we sought to have the most suitable model that can be adapted to our data 
(without considering groupings by countries) in the light of AIC and BIC information criteria. 
The procedure we used is the “Backwise” procedure which entails using a logit model containing 
all  the  potential  explanatory  variables,  and  then  successively  eliminating  those  that  are  less 
significant. Since we had a model with a range of significant variables to a certain level (10%), 
the choice of the final model was made by comparing the information criteria of the various 
models. The model we adopted is as follows: 
 
fs = g(fp-ta,tctc,fdi-pib,inflation,creasp-pib,cre-export)               (6) 
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5   The Econometric Analysis 
 
5.1 The approach adopted 
 
Most studies carried out on this topic end up by making estimates of the data panel; with the 
panel being made up of either banks or countries (banking sub-system). Given that our study had 
to cover a set of 6 (six) banking sub-systems, we therefore had to adopt an approach whose 
outcome could be an estimation on panel data. However, to do this (make estimates on panel 
data), we needed to clearly specify the model, particularly with regard to uniformity between 
countries. 
 
“From the econometric point of view, this means testing the equality of the individual coefficients 
of the model under study. At the economic level, specification tests entail determining if it is right 
to suppose that the theoretical model under study is perfectly similar for all the countries, or if on 
the contrary there are peculiarities that are unique to each country.” (Hurlin [17], 2003). 
 
The initial model we had in mind can be summarized in the following formula
24: 
 
yit = g(xitβi + ci) + Eit               (7) 
 
where i = 1..N (country index), and t = 1..T (time index), Eit follows a logistic law. 
 
At the end of the test procedure, there are three possible scenarios: 
 
 
o  Estimating individual models for each country. 
 
This case arises where the procedure being used rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables for all the countries are equal. Therefore the data generating process is not 
identical for all the countries. With this, we had to estimate the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables for each country taken individually. 
 
o  Estimating a common model for all the countries. 
 
This case arises where it is accepted that the coefficients of explanatory variables and those of 
constants for each country are equal. The data is got from the same generating process and can 
thus be brought together for estimation purposes. In this case, we use the ordinary assessment 
parameters for an equation. 
 
o  Estimating a model on panel data. 
 
This is some sort of an intermediate situation between the two other scenarios presented above. 
Here, the testing procedure admits the equality  of explanatory variables coefficients between 
                                                 
24 This is certainly a “strong” hypothesis we are making here, but it is generally admitted in the study of time series, 
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countries,  but  rejects  the  equality  of  constants  for  the  countries.  This  situation  denotes  the 
presence of inobservable individual effects for countries, notwithstanding an indentical response 
in terms of the explanatory variables being considered. The parameters are then assessed using 
panel  techniques  with  the  first  stage  being  to  determine  whether  the  inobservable  individual 
effect is a random or fixed value. 
 
Therefore,  the  next  stage  of  the  approach  strongly  depends  on  the  outcome  of  the  testing 
procedure presented above. That is why we will start by carrying out this testing procedure in 
order to determine the assessment technique which will later be used. 
 
We have now come to the extreme case which stipulates  that there is a perfect heterogeneity 
between CEMAC countries in view of the variables under consideration. With this, we have to 
assess the coefficients of each country taken individually. 
 
At the end of this series of assessments of individual equations, we keep in mind that, on the 
whole,  the  model  adopted  turned  to  be  significant  at  5%  for  three  countries  (Cameroon, 
Equatorial  Guinea  and  Central  African  Republic).  In  these  three  countries,  the  effect  of  the 
variables  considered  in  the  model  seems  to  be  virtually  the  same.  The  deterioration  of  the 
banking system will be reduced with an increase in the resources generated by the system itself, 
increase in the exchange rate and, paradoxically
25, an increase in inflation. The factors that cause 
the deterioration of the banking system are: claims over the private sector and foreign direct 
investments. However, almost all the coefficients obtained are non significant at 5%. This would 
probably be due to limited number of observations available for each country given the high 
number of parameters to be assessed. 
 
Not being satisfied with the results obtained while assessing the individual equation for each 
country, we  will now develop an  alternative  model to that of the uniformity tests which we 
applied in section (5.2). 
 
5.2   Developing a panel data model 
 
The  model  we  are  going  to  develop  is  a  one-factor  panel  model  generally  expressed  by  the 
equation: 
 
yit = g(xitβ + ci) + Eit            (8) 
 
where xit is a 1 × K order matrix of explanatory variables, i = 1...N , t = 1...T . 
 
N refers to the number of individuals (in our case N is CEMAC countries) and T, the number of 
periods. 
 
ci, i = 1...N represent inobserved individual effects. 
                                                 
25 In theory, inflation constitutes a threat to monetary stability, and maintaining a low and relatively stable level of 
inflation seems to be the aim of many Central banks including that of CEMAC. This effect could however be 
justified as we indicated earlier (4.3.2) by a low level of inflation (0.76 on average with a standard deviation of 2.06 
over the period under review).                                        Macro-Prudential Monitoring Indicators  24 
 
 
S. Yves Kamgna  J. Tinang Nzesseu  C. Tsombou Kinfak 
Eit represent the terms of supposedly independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) errors. 
 
The application of this assessment technique is done using the hypothesis that the individuals put 
together have common characteristics (similar reaction to the variables considered), even though 
they may possibly have peculiarities. Therefore, we suppose that the coefficients βk, k = 1…K are 
identical for all the countries and ci, i = 1...N are inobservable effects, that are specific to each 
country. 
 
5.2.1   Fixed individual effects or random individual effects 
 
The assessment method of this model entails that it should first be determined whether these 
inobservable individual effects are random or fixed. Actually, choosing one of the models (with 
random  effects  or  fixed  effects)  is  guided  by  the  assuption  that  is  made  on  the  correlation 
between the explanatory variables (xit) and the individual effects (ci). 
 
In the literature review, the Hausman test is generally used to choose a model with random or 
fixed individual effects by comparing the indicators obtained in the two cases.  The most obvious 
hypothesis is to assume the random effects. Assuming the random individual effects could find 
justification in the fact that not all the variables that can be used to explain the interest variable 
are taken into account (case of omitted variables) (op.cit [17]). This test is based on Fisher’s 
statistics, with the null hypothesis being the equality of the coefficients obtained by the random 
and fixed individual effects models.  With this test, we were able to validate the choice of a 
random individual effects model (p − value = 0.36 > 0.05). 
 
 
5.2.2   Assessing and interpreting the model 
 
The model is globally significant at 5%, the coefficients of the model are almost all significant at 
this threshold. The contribution of individual effects to the variance of errors is nill (σu ≈ 0 and ρ 
= 0); which does not exactly correspond to the expectations following the results obtained during 
the uniformity test. The average probability of the deterioration of the CEMAC banking system is 
estimated at 0.29. This probability is calculated by taking into account the average levels of the 
explanatory variables used.  The marginal effects of these variables will later be interpreted in 
relation to this reference position. 
 
The model reveals that claims over the private sector for a particular period, have a positive 
impact  on  the  probability  of  deterioration  of  the  banking  system  for  the  following  period. 
Therefore, a 1% increase in claims over the private sector in relation to their average value will 
lead to a 12% increase in the probability of deterioration of the banking system when compared 
to the reference risk, during the following period. 
 
The risk of deterioration of the banking system is equally an increasing function of foreign direct 
investments (FDIs) and the combined trend of credits to the private sector and exports. This 
means that an increase in FDIs will lead to an increase in the risk of failure of the banking 
system, and a combined increase in credits to the private sector and exports. Thus, an average 1% 
increase in FDIs will lead to a 0.18% increase in risk of deterioration; a 1% joint increase in 
credits to the private sector and exports will lead to a 0.76% increase in the deterioration risk.                                        Macro-Prudential Monitoring Indicators  25 
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The risk of deterioration of the banking system is reduced by owners’ equity, exchange rate 
variations and inflation. Therefore, a 1% increase in the internal resources of the banking system 
will  reduce  its  deterioration  probability  by 14.78%;  a  1%  increase  in  the exchange  rate  will 
reduce the risk of deterioration of the banking system by 0.07%; finally, a 1% increase in the 
inflation rate will reduce the probability of failure of the banking system by 0.32%. 
 
5.3   Developing a common model for all the countries 
 
This assessment method supposes that all the data is got using the same generating process. The 
assessment is thus made using data that has been collated irrespective of countries. It was done on 
the assumption that the error distribution is that of the logistic law
26. On the whole, the model is 
significant  at  1%  and  presents  a  reclassification  power  of  about  72%.  We  realised  that  the 
coefficients obtained are identical to those obtained by assessment through panel data, thereby 
confirming the results obtained by the assessment using panel data, especially with regard to the 
nullity of inobservable individual effects noticed during the assessment. 
 
These two models would thus entail perfect homogeneity between CEMAC countries in terms of 
variables considered. This seems possible with CEMAC, although it is contrary to the results 
obtained during the uniformity tests procedure. 
                                                 
26 Generally, the choice is made between a probit model and a logit model. We came to this conclusion by using the 
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The aim of this study is to provide the regulator of the banking system in the CEMAC region 
with  a  limited  number  of  macro-prudential  monitoring  indicators  in  order  to  enhance  the 
efficiency  of  the  supervision  of  the  banking  system,  through  permanent  monitoring  of  the 
dynamics of its weakness, and reduce its costs. To this end, we: 
 
- Started by presenting the concept of macro-prudential monitoring which sees the monitoring of 
the  system  from  a  standpoint  different  from  that  of  micro-prudential  monitoring  which  was 
hitherto used by central bank managers. The macroprudential approach pays particular attention 
to the factors that make a financial system vulnerable and the interaction between macroenomic 
trends  and  financial  stability,  while  the  micro-prudential  approach  seeks  to  protect  clients’ 
deposits by assessing the solvency of each bank. 
 
-  And  then,  we  presented  the  theoretical  analytical  framework  by  defining  the  concepts  of 
weakness and deterioration. Through the application of this theoretical framework, we were later 
able to develop an econometric model that could be used to identify the indicators which can be 
used to predict a possible deterioration in the situation of the banking system. 
 
- At the end of this analysis, it emerges that the regulator needs to pay particular attention to six 
variables, coming from all the macroeconomic variables (foreign direct investments, exchange 
rate and inflation), all the aggregate microprudential variables (claims over the private sector and 
owners’ equity), and from the combination of these two (the junction of increase in credits to the 
private sector  and exports). Thus, from  a reference situation defined by the average level of 
model variables and a 29.1% risk of deterioration, a 1% GDP increase in claims over the private 
sector would lead to a 12.1% increase in the risk of deterioration of the banking system. While a 
1% increase in the internal resources of the banking system as a percentage of total assets, would 
lead to a 14.8% reduction in this risk. These two variables stand out from the rest through the 
magnitude of their impact on the risk of deterioration of the CEMAC banking system. 
 
With this study, we were able to identify a set of aggregate micro-prudential variables, macro-
prudential variables and other variables drawn from a combination of micro-macro indicators, 
which  can  be  used  to  predict  a  deteriorating  situation  in  the  CEMAC  banking  system.  By 
determining the marginal effects of each of the variables on the probability of deterioration of the 
banking system, we were able to establish a hierarchy of variables, with regard to the importance 
we think the regulator should attach to them. Through some routines, this forecasting model 
could  easily  be  automated  such  that,  at  any  one  time,  it  can  readily  give  the  regulator  the 
probability of deterioration of the banking system. In fact, the marginal effects of the model 
variables could be assessed for the current situation of banking system, that is, on the date t
27. 
With  this,  once  the  values  of  the  model  variables  have  been  found  in  t+1,  we  can  find  the 
probability of deterioration in the system for that date. Thus, such a mechanism will be used not 
only  to  monitor  the  evolution  of  the  banking  system  but  also  to  simulate  the  scenarios  of 
situational changes and observe their repercussions on the stability of the baking system. 
                                                 
27 It should be recalled that the abovementioned marginal effects (5.2.2) were calculated using the point average over 
the period under review and could thus be used for all dates.                                        Macro-Prudential Monitoring Indicators  27 
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The main shortcoming of this study is in the number of variables initially taken into account. The 
cummulative marginal effect of model variables which have a positive impact on the probability 
of deterioration is only about 14% while that of variables with a negative impact is about 18%. 
Several other macroeconomic variables on which we did not have any data over the period under 
review, could be included in the analysis, and among them, some could even turn out to be 
important for predicting the deterioration of the banking system. Moreover, the model does not 
take into account some characteristics that are specific to the banking system which could be 
considered as qualitative variables, especially those relating to regulation and structuring of the 
system. 
 
Having in mind the abovementioned observations and considering the dynamism of the economy 
of the sub-region, we recommend that this study should be repeated, this time with a broader 
database to verify the accuracy of the results obtained, and updated on a regular basis in order to 
identify  new  warning  variables  and  eliminate  those  which  may  become  unrealiable  in  their 
forecasts.                                        Macro-Prudential Monitoring Indicators  28 
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